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 Alan Tapper and Stephan Millett 
Is Professional Ethics Grounded 
in General Ethical Principles?
Th is article questions the commonly held view that professional ethics 
is grounded in general ethical principles, in particular, respect for client 
(or patient) autonomy and benefi cence in the treatment of clients (or 
patients). Although these are admirable as general ethical principles, we 
argue that there is considerable logical diffi  culty in applying them to the 
professional- client relationship. Th e transition from general principles 
to professional ethics cannot be made because the intended conclusion 
applies diff erently to each of the parties involved, whereas the premise 
is a general principle that applies equally to both parties. It is widely 
accepted that professionals are required to recognize that clients or pa-
tients possess rights to autonomy that are more than the general rights 
to personal autonomy accepted in ordinary social life, and that profes-
sionals are expected to display benefi cence toward their clients that is 
more than the benefi cence expected of anyone in ordinary social life. 
Th e comparative component of professional ethics is an intrinsic feature 
of the professional situation, and thus it cannot be bypassed in working 
out a proper professional ethics. Th us, we contend, the proper profes-
sional treatment of clients or patients has not been explained by appeal 
to general ethical principles.
From Ethical Principles to Professional Ethics
A basis in general ethical principles is not the only model for the biomedi-
cal or health- care ethics of the past fi ft y years, but it has been and is still 
the dominant model. It is understood as the application of, commonly but 
not exclusively, four ethical principles: respect for persons (or autonomy), 
benefi cence, nonmalefi cence, and justice. Th e principles are seen as appli-
cable to a variety of practical biomedical or health- care contexts, such as 
professional- patient relationships, medical research approvals, health- care 
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resource allocation, and genetic manipulation. Th e dominant principlist text 
has been Beauchamp and Childress’s classic work Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (1979 and subsequent editions). Principlism can be viewed as an ex-
ample of the application of general ethical principles to particular contexts. 
And there may be any number of good ethical principles— as few as one or 
as many as ten, according to various accounts (following Veatch, 2012, pp. 
164– 182). Whatever the number, we will call each of these approaches a ver-
sion of principles- based ethics if the favored principles are used as the main 
basis for resolving problems and guiding behavior in practical ethics.
Th e principles- based approach to ethics has been the subject of much 
debate (e.g., Richardson, 1990; DeGrazia, 1992; Lustig, 1992; Pellegrino & 
Th omasma, 1993; Veatch, 1995; Engelhardt, 1996; Gert, Culver, & Clouser, 
2000; Richardson, 2000; Strong, 2000; O’Neill, 2002; Beauchamp, 2003b; 
Campbell, 2003; Dawson & Garrard, 2003; Gillon, 2003; Macklin, 2003; 
May, 2003; Tauber, 2005; DeMarco & Ford, 2006; Rhodes, 2007; Walker, 
2009). Primarily the debate has concerned the appropriate weighting of 
one principle over the others. Extensive though this debate has been, it is 
not clear to us that there has been much discussion of the relation between 
principlism and professional ethics. Th e two are usually discussed sepa-
rately. Our topic is the relation between them. We wish to present a logical 
criticism. Our contention is that no form of principles- based ethics can 
justify the conclusions that they have been commonly used to support in 
professional health- care ethics. Th e conclusions may be morally admirable 
and in accordance with accepted professional practice, but the inference 
from principles to conclusions in professional health- care ethics, we will 
argue, is invalid.
We will focus our argument on principlism, and specifi cally on two of 
the four principles put forward by Beauchamp and Childress. One is the 
idea of patient (or client) autonomy; the other is the idea of professional 
altruism or benefi cence, sometimes also called an ideal of service. We ac-
cept the consensus view that patient or client autonomy is important and 
should in the normal case take priority over the professional paternalism 
that may result if benefi cence is given priority over autonomy. We also ac-
cept that professionals should be motivated by a special kind of altruism 
or benefi cence. Th is benefi cence manifests itself in various ways: in not 
exploiting the monopoly position conferred on the profession; in under-
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taking a certain amount of pro bono work; in being willing to pass on one’s 
knowledge and skills to the next generation of the profession; but most 
of all it is manifested in a zeal for the well- being of one’s clients, at least in 
the range of matt ers that falls within one’s professional expertise. A profes-
sional should put that expertise into the service of the client.
Th ere are two phases in the professional- client relationship, phases 
that may be repeated in series throughout the relationship: the contract-
ing phase, when the treatment or service is decided upon; and the per-
formance phase, when the treatment is carried out. Th e principle of re-
spect for client autonomy operates at the fi rst stage, and the principle of 
benefi cence comes into play mainly, though not only, in the second stage. 
We accept the contention that the principle of client autonomy normally 
takes precedence over professional benefi cence when the two are in con-
fl ict (Gillon, 2003; but see also Dawson & Garrard, 2003), but we will ar-
gue that basing an ethic for professionals on general principles does not 
explain why client autonomy should take precedence.
Nothing in our argument is intended to count against the importance 
of client autonomy and professional benefi cence as guides to ethical con-
duct in the professions. Our argument is an argument against an argument 
for certain conclusions, not an argument against the conclusions them-
selves. For example, “Fred is a philosopher, so Fred is a wise man” is an 
argument that can be countered with “But many philosophers are unwise” 
(examples can be adduced). Th is sound counterargument in no way shows 
that Fred is not a wise man. Our concern is about the inference from gen-
eral principles to professional health- care ethics.
The Logic of the Problem
It is our view that those who follow principlism must be drawing a certain 
kind of inference, and that the inference is invalid. However, we face an 
initial diffi  culty. To present our argument, the obvious strategy would be 
to quote those passages where the inference we object to is being drawn. 
But it is no easy matt er to show exactly where the inference is spelt out. 
If we turn, for example, to any of the seven editions of Beauchamp and 
Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, we can nowhere fi nd a passage 
where the problematic inference lies plainly on the page. Th at there is such 
an inference is nicely shown by Tom L. Beauchamp when he says:
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A principle, in our [Beauchamp and Childress’s] account, is a fun-
damental standard of conduct from which many other moral stan-
dards and judgments draw support, standing, and specifi cation. 
For example, core professional duties can be delineated on the ba-
sis of basic moral principles. (2003a, p. 28)
It is the validity of this “delineation” or inference that we are question-
ing. How exactly do core professional duties “draw support, standing, and 
specifi cation” from these principles? We will return to Principles of Biomed-
ical Ethics further below.
For our purposes, then, it is best to construct an artifi cial argument 
to exhibit the general form of the invalidity. Here is a very simple form of 
principles- based ethics, using the two key principles:
(1)  Since respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle, the au-
tonomy of patients (or clients) ought to be respected by health- 
care professionals.
(2) Since benefi cence is a sound ethical principle, health- care profes-
sionals ought to act toward their patients (or clients) in a benefi -
cent manner.
Th ese are both arguments, each with one premise and one conclusion. In 
both, the premise is a general one, while the conclusion is specifi c.
Our objection to these arguments is simple. In the professional situa-
tion, when professional and client are engaged in making decisions about 
treatment, there are two parties, each of whom is capable of being the fi nal 
decision maker and each of whom has a claim to have her autonomy re-
spected and to be the recipient of benefi cent actions. However, principles- 
based professional ethics concludes that it is the client and not the pro-
fessional whose autonomy is to be respected and whose needs are to be 
treated benefi cently. Th ese conclusions are not sustained by arguments of 
the form in (1) and (2) above, because in each case the premise applies 
equally to client and professional and not diff erentially to privilege the cli-
ent or patient. It is generally agreed that there is an asymmetry between 
the ethical expectations that apply to the professional and those that apply 
to the client. Professional ethics is designed to ensure that the professional 
uses her knowledge ethically and well, that is, in the interests of the cli-
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ent or patient. However, it places no special expectations on the client or 
patient as to how one should behave toward the professional. Th e asym-
metry arises at least from the imbalance of knowledge between the two 
parties. As Pellegrino and Th omasma put it, “Th e professional possesses 
the knowledge that the patient or client needs. Th is places the preponder-
ance of power in her hands. She can use it well or poorly, for good or evil, 
for service or self- interest” (1993, p. 155). Or, in the words of William F. 
May, “Th is asymmetricality in knowledge [between professional and lay-
person] creates in turn an asymmetricality in power, a gap between the 
powerful and the relatively powerless. Th is discrepancy in power intensi-
fi es the moral duties of professionals, especially in the helping professions” 
(2001, p. 8). How, though, does this discrepancy intensify the moral duties 
of the professional? What further premises are being assumed here?
Th is asymmetry makes the conclusion that a principles- based ethics 
seeks to validate necessarily a comparative one; that is, the expectation for 
the client diff ers from the expectation of the professional in the above ex-
amples. General ethical principles are meant to govern the behavior of any 
and all, not just the behavior of some to some others. Th at is what is meant 
by calling them “general.” It follows that, all else being equal, the general 
ethical principles of respect for autonomy and of benefi cence apply equally 
to how clients should treat professionals and to how professionals should 
treat clients. Th us, clients should respect the autonomy of professionals 
quite as much as professionals should respect the autonomy of clients. 
Likewise, if benefi cence is required of professionals, it is equally required 
of clients. Th is being so, the general ethical principles as employed in (1) 
and (2) do not vindicate the conclusions they are supposed to vindicate.
For a principles- based ethics to require the professional always to put 
the patient or client fi rst, that is, for it to apply more strongly to the pro-
fessional in any professional- client (or patient) relationship, the argument 
would need to be amended somehow. But can that be done?
We might, for example, amend the argument to a form something 
like these:
(3) Since respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle, the autono-
my of clients ought to be respected by health- care professionals in a 
manner that gives priority to the client’s treatment preferences over 
the professional’s preferred treatment in cases where the two clash.
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(4) Since benefi cence is a sound ethical principle, health- care profes-
sionals ought to act toward their clients in a manner that demon-
strates greater benefi cence than the benefi cence expected of the 
client toward the professional.
Th e conclusion is what we want, but the inferences are plainly invalid. Th e 
premises are simply irrelevant to the conclusions. Since the conclusions 
we are seeking to justify involve a comparison between two items in a cer-
tain category, we need reasons that bear on that comparison, not merely 
reasons that point out general features of the category as a whole. No gen-
eral principle can generate specifi c conclusions in this way. Th e problem in 
these arguments is not merely that they are not deductively valid; it is that 
the inferences are not even weakly justifi ed.
If we are right about this, and since the point is not an arcane one when 
presented as we present it, how is it that it has not been noted and dealt 
with long ago? Th e answer seems to be found in the way we have formulat-
ed the conclusion of the principlist argument. In our view, the conclusion 
has to be a comparative one, that is, one that applies diff erentially to profes-
sional and patient or client. As far as we can tell, this point is not commonly 
observed. Th e conclusion is commonly seen as simply a matt er of how pro-
fessionals should behave or of what respect patients should be accorded.
The Nature of the Conclusion
We need further discussion about the conclusions that a principles- based 
ethics aspires to defend. We can simplify matt ers by focusing on the princi-
ple of respect for autonomy. In its general form, it requires respect for per-
sons as autonomous agents. But exactly what conclusion is that principle 
intended to justify when applied to professional ethics? Th e conclusion is 
commonly assumed to be something about patient rights or, more gener-
ally, client rights. Th e rights of the patient in the professional consultation 
should be respected. Stated in that way, nothing is said about what those 
rights are. Th e rights of the patient may consist simply in the right to the 
best possible treatment, as determined by the clinician or the health- care 
professional. But this is not what the principle of respect for autonomy is 
meant to vindicate; in fact, it is the very thing that it is supposed to over-
turn. Th e intended conclusion is that, aft er consultation and the disclosure 
Tapper and Millett : General Ethical Principles?  67
of treatment options by the professional, the competent patient has a right 
to be treated in a way determined by the patient. Th e principle of respect for 
autonomy, as commonly understood in professional ethics, involves the 
allocation of a decision- making right to the patient. Th at is the core of the 
idea of informed consent. At the end of the consultation process, in most 
cases (e.g., where the patient is a conscious and competent adult) the pa-
tient gets the fi nal say. In practice, this right may amount to nothing more 
than the right to choose between a very limited set of options. Sometimes 
there may be only one course of treatment that the professional can pro-
pose. But always the patient reserves the right to refuse treatment, and, 
when more than one option is available, the choice of treatment lies with 
the patient. Th e point is that, if we accept the autonomy principle, then we 
accept that the professional proposes and the patient disposes. Were it the 
case that the professional both proposes and disposes, then the principle 
of autonomy would have been overridden.
Nothing is gained at this point by conceiving of the professional and 
client as arriving jointly at a treatment decision, even though both usu-
ally do contribute to the decision. Th e old Polish saying that “When we 
agree, you decide; when we disagree, I decide” illustrates this point. What 
matt ers is who has the say when they disagree. Of course, our argument 
presupposes that the patient is in a fi t and proper state to participate in the 
decision- making process, but we are taking that for granted here. Where 
the patient cannot make appropriate decisions, then her “autonomy” pass-
es to her next of kin or to some nominated proxy; and where this is impos-
sible, a professional or some professional group must act as her trustee. 
But all this only shows that she really does have autonomy that ought to be 
respected as far as it possibly can be. It does not show that she lacks a set 
of rights; only that she lacks the capacity to exercise those rights. A proxy 
or trustee who acted in disregard of those rights would be acting wrongly.
Th e discussion so far shows that the conclusion that the autonomy 
principle is intended to support is indeed a comparative one. Th at is, in a 
professional- client relationship, the conclusion for one party diff ers from 
that for the other party. Th us, the conclusion as described in argument 
(1), that is, “the autonomy of patients (or clients) ought to be respected 
by health- care professionals,” is not suffi  cient. Th e conclusion needed is in 
fact as described in argument (3), that is, “the autonomy of clients ought 
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to be respected by health- care professionals in a manner that gives priority 
to the client’s treatment preferences over the professional’s preferred treat-
ment in cases where the two clash.” As we said above, for the argument 
to be consistent with accepted practice, the conclusion has to be that the 
client and not the professional is to make the decision.
Th e conclusions that a principles- based ethics intends to vindicate are 
comparative in nature. Yet the argument designed to support those conclu-
sions fails because the inference is invalid. Th e asymmetrical conclusion in 
principles- based professional ethics that it is the client and not the profes-
sional whose autonomy is to be respected and whose needs are to be cared 
for cannot be sustained by arguments of the form of (1) and (2). Th e prem-
ise applies equally to client and professional, but for a comparative conclu-
sion to be valid the argument has to contain a reason why in a professional- 
client relationship one and not the other should make the fi nal decision.
Alternative Formulations
Of course, the principles- based argument may be more complex than we 
have allowed. It may possess more than the one premise we have allowed 
to it. Objections to an argument may fail because the argument has been 
misconstrued or oversimplifi ed. Th at is the essence of the straw man fal-
lacy. So, possibly, we have been att acking a straw man. Here we will try to 
reconstruct the principlist position more charitably.
If the principles strategy is to work, the additional premises need to 
lead to conclusions about the professional situation. Th us, some features 
of that situation must appear in the premises employed by the principles 
approach. We will put forward some ways that the description of the situ-
ation might appear in the premises and show that in each case there is an 
invalid inference.
Th e premise we need cannot simply be that principles are being ap-
plied to the professional situation. Such an argument might look like this:
(5) Since respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle, and since 
professionals ought to respect the autonomy of their clients, the 
autonomy of patients ought to be respected by health- care profes-
sionals in a manner that gives priority to the patient’s treatment 
preferences over the professional’s preferred treatment in cases 
where the two clash.
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In this argument neither the second premise nor the fi rst includes the 
comparative element that appears in the conclusion, and it is the lack of 
this comparative element that we see as causing the inference to fail in the 
standard formulations by which a principlist approach is applied to profes-
sional situations.
Alternatively, it might look like this:
(6) Since respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle, it follows 
that professionals ought to respect the autonomy of their clients; 
and from that we can conclude that the autonomy of patients 
ought to be respected by health- care professionals in a manner 
that gives priority to the patient’s treatment preferences over the 
professional’s preferred treatment in cases where the two clash.
Th is is a two- step argument. Th e fi rst step is straightforward, the conclu-
sion being merely an instantiation of the generalization that the premise 
articulates. Th e problem now lies in the second step, and clearly, the prob-
lem (the lack of a comparative element) is unchanged. Neither (5) nor (6) 
is what we are aft er. Th e same points apply, mutatis mutandis, to the appli-
cation of the principle of benefi cence to the professional situation.
Th e problem we are dealing with arises because the conclusion we 
wish to justify is comparative, and for the argument to be cogent the prem-
ises must bear on that comparison. For the inference to be valid, the gen-
eral ethical principle needs to be supplemented by some other premise 
that contains a comparative component.
Professional ethics diff ers from general ethics in large part because (as 
we saw from Pellegrino and Th omasma and from May) there is asymme-
try in knowledge between the parties involved in a professional- patient (or 
client) relationship. So, why not build this asymmetry into the premises? 
Taking benefi cence as the target, the argument might go like this:
(7) Since benefi cence is a sound ethical principle, and since those who 
possess superior knowledge owe benefi cence to those who are less 
knowledgeable, healthcare professionals ought to act toward their 
clients in a manner that demonstrates greater benefi cence than the 
benefi cence expected of the client toward the professional.
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Th is argument has merit, in that the premises are plausible and clearly 
relevant to the conclusion. But it also has two diffi  culties. First, is it really 
clear that those who possess superior knowledge owe benefi cence to those 
who are less knowledgeable? Is this a duty generally recognized? Or is it 
something supererogatory; that is, we admire those who do help others 
by off ering their superior knowledge, but we don’t require it? If it is the 
latt er, then this falls short of accounting for the professional duty of benefi -
cence toward clients. It is hard also to see how it can be the former, that is, 
a duty generally recognized. In capitalist markets, for example, superior 
knowledge is desirable, but those who have superior knowledge are not 
obligated to demonstrate benefi cence to those who (merely) do not. One 
with superior knowledge may have an obligation to show benefi cence to 
certain groups, such as those who are weak or vulnerable, but this is a gen-
eral obligation and not one that arises because one has greater knowledge. 
Second, even if this is acceptable, how can we use this argument to arrive 
at the professional duty of respect for patient autonomy? A suitable argu-
ment cannot be as follows:
(8) Since respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle, and since 
those who possess superior knowledge owe benefi cence to those 
who are less knowledgeable, the autonomy of patients ought to be 
respected by health- care professionals in a manner that gives prior-
ity to the patient’s treatment preferences over the professional’s 
preferred treatment in cases where the two clash.
Nor can the argument we are seeking be this:
(9) Since respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle, and since 
those who possess superior knowledge owe respect for the autono-
my of those who are less knowledgeable, the autonomy of patients 
ought to be respected by health- care professionals in a manner 
that gives priority to the patient’s treatment preferences over the 
professional’s preferred treatment in cases where the two clash.
Here the second premise is incoherent. Th ere is no reason to doubt that re-
spect for autonomy is a good general principle, but having superior knowl-
edge does nothing to increase the level of respect required toward those 
with lesser knowledge. In general, increased knowledge tends to work the 
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other way. Parents have greater knowledge than their children, and this is 
one reason why they can be justifi ed in overruling their children’s wishes. 
Between adults with diff ering degrees of knowledge, all that is morally re-
quired is that the more knowledgeable do not override the autonomy of 
the less knowledgeable, not that they should defer to their wishes more 
than they would defer to the wishes of other more knowledgeable people.
The Patient’s Body and Interests
When we have presented the above arguments, we sometimes meet the 
following rejoinder. Th e argument from general principle to profession-
al obligation can be made successfully if we add a premise or two about 
whose interests and needs are at stake. Th e argument can be presented as 
follows (with thanks to Hugh Breakey for this formulation):
(10) Respect for autonomy is a sound ethical principle.
(11) Autonomy is about having control over one’s life and what hap-
pens to one’s body.
(12) In usual cases, medical treatment of X by Y is centrally concerned 
with X’s life and X’s body.
(13) To the extent that Y’s life- plan and body are implicated, Y will 
usually have made such choices prior to meeting the patient (and 
probably prior to her choosing medicine as her job).
Th erefore, (14) in most cases of medical treatment, X’s autonomy is a 
priority.
Th is formulation has the potential to solve the problem of how to get from 
general principles to an asymmetrical conclusion, since (12) and (13) to-
gether supply the asymmetry needed in the premises. Th e solution is a 
simple one. Th e doctor requires permission to perform an operation be-
cause it is the patient and not the doctor who is having something done 
to her. Th e patient’s agreement is necessary because it is her body that is 
having things done to it by others.
In response to this apparently cogent solution, there is a preliminary 
point worth mentioning. If the principlism model is applicable to profession-
al ethics in general, then the special rights of the client and the special duties 
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of the professional cannot rest simply on the claim that the patient’s body is at 
risk. Other professions, such as accountancy, architecture, engineering, law, 
or teaching, don’t deal with human bodies in this sort of way. Th ey deal with 
the client’s fi nances, buildings, rights and knowledge, and so forth. It may be 
that these are put at risk when professional guidance and action are sought. 
Th e risk is a risk to the client’s interests, and not just to her body.
How strong is this apparently cogent argument? Consider fi rst the 
point about risks. We can agree that the patient or client is subject to risk 
when undertaking treatment from a professional. But there are risks on 
the other side too. For example, in addition to harm to a patient, an ill- 
performed operation can hurt the reputation of a surgeon quite consider-
ably. A moment’s carelessness can lead to professional disciplinary action 
against a physician. Are these risks to be weighed up in allocating decision- 
making rights? If for some reason the risk to the professional was large and 
that to the patient was small, would that be suffi  cient to override the nor-
mal assumption that the patient should be the fi nal decision maker? We 
think not. We think that the decision- making rights of the patient are pre-
eminent, regardless of the risks that the professional might face, but that 
standard formulations of professional ethics based in general principles do 
not adequately explain this.
Consider the point about needs. We can take it as given that the pa-
tient has special needs that lead her to seek professional help. We can agree 
that “In usual cases, medical treatment of X by Y is centrally concerned 
with X’s needs.” But, again, there may be needs of various sorts on the 
other side. Th e physician may be stressed, overworked, underpaid, unwell, 
and so on. If so, benefi cence toward her would be a good thing. Indeed, as 
Draper and Sorell (2002) argue, a patient or client would have obligations 
toward the professional in such a situation, obligations that “fl ow from 
general ethics” and which would apply to all people. But facts of this sort 
about the professional’s situation don’t alter the decision- making rights 
of the patient with regard to her own treatment. Th e needs of the profes-
sional are matt ers to be dealt with in other ways.
Th e general problem here is to explain why, in the professional situ-
ation, the principles of autonomy and benefi cence are regarded (in our 
view, rightly) as indefeasible in all normal cases. Of course, client or pa-
tient autonomy is not unlimited: professionals cannot be morally required 
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by their client or patient to do things that are illegal or futile or a waste of 
public resources or fi nancially unremunerative when the client can aff ord 
to pay. Special cases such as where the patient seeks an abortion or eutha-
nasia and the doctor’s conscience will not allow her to perform it are not 
at issue here. For one thing, in such a case the doctor would have not pro-
posed abortion or euthanasia as a possible treatment. Our concern is only 
for the situation that arises aft er treatment options have been proposed by 
the professional to the patient. In that situation it is not too much to regard 
the patient’s right to decide as indefeasible, assuming only that the patient 
is competent to make such a decision.
The Problem in Principles of Biomedical Ethics
So far in this article we have been outlining what we called an “artifi cial 
argument” and following its logic to demonstrate a serious diffi  culty in 
applying general ethical principles to the professional situation. We have 
not to this point tried to show that any writers do in fact fall victim to the 
problem we are trying to articulate. However, we do have an obligation to 
discuss at least one instance where in our view the problem does arise. Th e 
key text in the principlist literature is Beauchamp and Childress’s Princi-
ples of Biomedical Ethics, now in its seventh edition (2013). As we remarked 
earlier, it is not easy to fi nd a passage anywhere in Principles where the 
problematic inference is plainly visible. One possible place is their chap-
ter on “Professional- Patient Relationships,” in which the authors deal with 
“rules” governing veracity, privacy, confi dentiality, and fi delity (2009, pp. 
288– 331). In this chapter, veracity, privacy, and confi dentiality are topics 
that do not generate the problem we are diagnosing. No question arises of 
comparing the professional’s and the layperson’s obligations with regard to 
these topics, since it is only sensitive information relating to the patient’s 
condition that is under consideration.
In the case of the rule of fi delity, however, our concerns do arise. Th ey 
characterize professional fi delity as
giving the patient’s interests priority in two respects: (1) the pro-
fessional eff aces self- interest in any situation that may confl ict with 
the patient’s interests, and (2) the professional favours the patient’s 
interests over others’ interests. (2009, p. 311)
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Clearly, this is what we have discussed as professional benefi cence. Th e 
general question is how to account for the higher standard of benefi cence 
expected of professionals toward their patients as compared with the be-
nefi cence expected between ordinary members of the community. In their 
third edition they remark:
Most obligations of positive benefi cence in health care rest on 
fi delity- generating contracts and role relations. In establishing a re-
lationship with a patient the physician makes an implicit or explicit 
promise to seek the patient’s welfare. Th e promise appears in the 
physician’s pledge or oath upon entry into the profession or in the 
profession’s code of ethics. (1989, pp. 341– 342)
Th ey then discuss “covenant” and “contract” approaches to the nature 
of fi delity. However, the discussion ends inconclusively:
It is misleading to try to capture the relationship between health- 
care professionals and patients in any single metaphor or model 
such as contractors, partners, parents, friends, or technicians. No 
single metaphor or model adequately expresses the complexity of 
health care or the moral principles and rules that should govern 
such relationships. (1989, pp. 343– 344)
Th e point here that is relevant to our concerns is the argument that bases 
professional benefi cence on promise keeping. Th is argument does deal 
with the comparative problem, since the professional has made a promise 
that the patient has not. But the introduction of a specifi c promise means 
that it no longer argues from the general principle of benefi cence to be-
nefi cence in the professional situation. In a footnote the authors observe 
that Charles Fried “has grounded the obligation of promise keeping in re-
spect for autonomy” and that John Rawls “has plausibly contended that 
the principle of fi delity is only a special case of fairness applied to social 
practices of promising” (1989, p. 362). Th us, the general ethical principle at 
work here is not benefi cence but either respect for autonomy or fairness. 
At best, there is a two- step justifi cation of professional benefi cence.
Basing professional benefi cence on promise keeping, whether implicit 
or explicit, is vulnerable to the objection that the expectation of benefi -
cence would apply even if no promise were explicitly made, as is the case 
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in most professions, and even if there were no professional code that in-
cludes a quasi- promise, as is the case in many professions. In fact in the 
fi ft h edition, Beauchamp and Childress say the following (a variation of 
which is in the fourth edition):
Th e patient- physician relationship is founded on trust and confi -
dence; and the physician is therefore necessarily a trustee for the 
patient’s medical welfare. Th is model of fi delity relies more on val-
ues of loyalty and trust than merely on being true to one’s word. 
Whether or not the physician makes a pledge or takes an oath 
upon entry into the profession, obligations of fi delity arise in this 
model whenever the physician establishes a relationship with the 
patient. (2001, pp. 312– 313)
Th is leaves it unclear how trust and loyalty are generated and how they re-
late to general ethical principles. Th e argument does not fi t with the over-
all program of Principles, and it was dropped in the sixth edition.
In any case, whatever the merits of basing professional benefi cence on 
promise keeping, it would at most provide a grounding for professional 
benefi cence. It would not ground respect for client autonomy, for reasons 
we have already given.
Beauchamp against Deductivism
It is possible that we are still barking up the wrong tree. We may be trying, 
misguidedly, to force principlism into a deductivist mold, when no such 
mold is needed or implied by the proponents of principlism. Such a view 
is suggested by Beauchamp in a 2007 paper. Replying to the work of Rob-
ert Baker and Laurence McCullough, he remarks:
By “applied ethics,” I think they [Baker and McCullough] must 
mean what, in this literature, has commonly been dubbed 
deductivism— one model of applied ethics and moral judgment in 
which justifi ed conclusions are deduced from a preexisting theo-
retical structure of normative precepts that cover the judgment. 
Th is model is inspired by justifi cation in disciplines such as math-
ematics, in which a claim is shown to follow logically (deductively) 
from credible premises. In ethics, the parallel idea is that justifi ca-
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tion occurs if and only if general principles or rules, together with 
the relevant facts of a situation (in the fi elds to which the theory 
is being applied) support an inference to the correct or justifi ed 
judgment(s). In short, the method of reasoning at work is the appli-
cation of a valid general norm to a clear case falling under the norm, 
thereby reaching the correct conclusion. (Beauchamp, 2007, p. 56)
Beauchamp’s objection to Baker and McCullough is that they construe “ap-
plied ethics” on a deductivist model. Beauchamp allows that “deductivism” 
is “one model of applied ethics and moral judgement,” but in his view, “No 
one uses or defends the model of ‘applied ethics’ that they [Baker and Mc-
Cullough] present. Th ey construct a straw man and then propose to replace 
it. Th e Baker- McCullough construal of applied ethics not only has had no 
infl uence in medical ethics; it has had no infl uence in philosophical ethics. 
What they called ‘applied ethics’ was entertained briefl y in the 1970s, but 
the model was wholly abandoned in less than a decade” (2007, p. 56).
Our argument may be vulnerable to a similar objection. It might be 
said that we are constructing and then att acking a deductivist straw man. 
But we think not, for two reasons. First, there is an inference being made 
by principlism. As Beauchamp put it, “core professional duties can be de-
lineated on the basis of basic moral principles” (2003a, p. 28). We take this 
delineation to involve a process of inference. We are simply analyzing how 
this inference might work, or fail to work. Second, we are arguing that no 
such inference can work, for the very general reason that the inference 
is from a symmetrical premise to an asymmetrical conclusion. If it is to 
work, the “delineation” must involve some asymmetry in the premises. But 
we think that how to build this asymmetry into the premises has not yet 
been explained. We are not assuming that it cannot be done. We are not 
assuming that the result must be a logically valid deductive argument. All 
we are assuming is that it must be a cogent argument.
One way forward here might be that of “specifying” the general ethi-
cal principles. Henry S. Richardson (2000) recommended this method, 
describing it in part as a way of applying general principles without sim-
ply engaging in “deductive subsumption.” To specify a principle is to do 
two things at once: to narrow its extension and to gloss its interpretation. 
Th e principle is specifi ed more narrowly as applying to a subset of possible 
Tapper and Millett : General Ethical Principles?  77
cases, and it is glossed more fully, to show how it applies to that subset. As 
an example, he proposes that the general principle “be generous and toler-
ant,” when faced with actions that are “beyond the pale,” can be specifi ed 
and applied as the narrower principle “be generous and tolerant towards 
all persons even when they have transgressed, but towards their behavior 
only when that behavior is within the pale” (2000, p. 300).
Could something like this solve the problem of this article? Can we 
specify Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles (or any other set of 
general principles) so that they apply to the professional situation in such 
a way as to account for the ethical asymmetry between professional and 
client? In this scenario, the ethical force of the general principles would 
be seen to apply with extra force to the professional. Beauchamp himself 
is an advocate of the specifi cation approach. In his interpretation, “Speci-
fi cation is a process of reducing the indeterminateness of general norms 
to give them increased action guiding capacity, while retaining the moral 
commitments in the original norm. Filling out the commitments of the 
norms with which one starts is accomplished by narrowing the scope of 
the norms” (2003b, p. 269). He adds that “Th ese specifi ed moralities in-
clude the many moral norms, aspirations, ideals, att itudes, and sensitivi-
ties that spring from cultural traditions, religious traditions, professional 
practice, institutional codes of ethics, and the like” (2003b, p. 270). A spec-
ifi cation that spells out the role of professional practice in the application 
of general norms does seem very desirable, if it can be articulated. But, at 
this stage, we think it remains to be achieved: as far as we know, no one 
has att empted to apply specifi cation to the transition from general ethical 
principles to professional ethics.
Conclusion
As we see it, then, there is a considerable logical diffi  culty in applying 
general ethical principles to the professional situation. Since the intro-
duction of principlism in the 1970s, modern professional ethics has as-
sumed that general ethical principles can provide clients with the rights 
and protections needed to prevent or remedy the misuse of professional 
powers. Th e aim is admirable, but the execution is open to question. Th e 
rights of the client or patient against the professional cannot be treated 
as similar to the rights of person against person. Th ey are not comparable 
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to the principle of equal liberty advocated by John Rawls (1971) or the 
negative liberties championed by Isaiah Berlin (1969). Th ey are a special 
right, not a general right (Hart, 1955). Likewise, the benefi cence expect-
ed of professionals toward their clients is not comparable to the general 
benefi cence championed by utilitarians and other benevolence theorists. 
It is a special benefi cence.
Our overall conclusion is this. We do not see how principles- based 
ethics can make the transition from general ethics to professional ethics, 
and if we are right in thinking that the transition cannot be made, then the 
most commonly accepted model in modern biomedical or healthcare eth-
ics is irreparably broken. Th e reason why the transition cannot be made is 
that the intended conclusion is comparative, that is, it applies diff erently 
to each of the parties involved, whereas the premise is a general principle. 
It is widely accepted that professionals are required to recognize that cli-
ents or patients possess rights to autonomy that are more than the gen-
eral rights to personal autonomy accepted in ordinary social life, and that 
professionals are expected to display benefi cence toward their clients that 
is more than the benefi cence expected of anyone in ordinary social life. 
Th e comparative component of professional ethics is an intrinsic feature 
of the professional situation, and thus it cannot be bypassed in working 
out a proper professional ethics. Our objection holds against Beauchamp 
and Childress’s principlism and any other form of principles- based ethics, 
since they all argue from general ethical principles to a position on profes-
sional ethics, without taking account of the comparative aspect, the asym-
metry, of the professional situation. However, we allow that we have not 
proven that some form of principles- based ethics cannot be rescued from 
our criticism.
Admitt edly, we have not tried to show here that the various principlist 
authors have in fact failed to address the problem we are describing. Th at 
would be a very large task. All we have done here is describe the prob-
lem in general and document it in the writings of Beauchamp and Chil-
dress. We also have to allow that we have not proven that some form of 
principles- based ethics cannot be rescued from our criticism. Possibly, 
suitable supplementary premises can be found to make the inference from 
general ethics to professional ethics valid. However, we do not see what 
they might be, and we think the onus lies on others to say what they are.
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We suggest, in addition, that the issues we are raising apply to all forms 
of principles- based professional ethics, not just to mainstream biomedical 
ethics, so the problem we are diagnosing, if real, may be a large one.
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